Swalwell Worked With New Mexico’s Delegation. What Security Safeguards Applied?

Eric Swalwell worked with members of New Mexico’s congressional delegation—including on an issue directly involving the nation’s nuclear-security enterprise.

On October 23, 2025, Representatives Melanie Stansbury and Teresa Leger Fernández joined Swalwell and other lawmakers in a letter challenging proposed furloughs at the National Nuclear Security Administration. The letter warned that workforce reductions threatened nuclear-security oversight and other critical responsibilities.

That collaboration was legitimate public policy work. It does not establish that classified information changed hands.

But given the publicly reported counterintelligence concerns surrounding Swalwell’s relationship with Christine Fang, a suspected Chinese intelligence operative, New Mexico’s delegation should address a straightforward question: What safeguards governed its coordination with Swalwell’s office, and did any of that work extend beyond public legislative business?

We are asking Senators Martin Heinrich and Ben Ray Luján and Representatives Stansbury, Gabe Vasquez, and Leger Fernández to answer publicly.

We have not established that any of them mishandled protected information. We are asking them to explain their stewardship of it.

The New Mexico connections are documented

The NNSA letter is the clearest connection to nuclear-security policy, but it is not the only documented collaboration.

These records establish legislative connections involving every member of New Mexico’s delegation. They do not establish close personal relationships, improper contacts, or unauthorized disclosures.

They do provide a factual starting point for questions the delegation can answer.

Was coordination limited to public letters and legislative proposals? Did any collaboration involve nonpublic information about New Mexico’s military installations, national laboratories, nuclear-security programs, or defense-related activities? What procedures governed any protected information?

A discussion occurring outside public view would not itself establish wrongdoing. Authorized officials routinely conduct nonpublic work. The issue is whether access and information sharing remained appropriate, authorized, and safeguarded.

The NNSA letter deserves a direct answer

Stansbury and Leger Fernández’s participation in the NNSA letter deserves particular attention because its subject was the nuclear-security workforce—not an unrelated domestic policy issue.

The letter addressed staffing, oversight, stockpile stewardship, modernization, and coordination with the Defense Department. Its authors argued for preserving NNSA’s capacity to perform those responsibilities.

We are not suggesting that defending the workforce was improper. The letter itself made a national-security argument.

We are asking what information supported that collaboration and what safeguards applied to any coordination beyond the public document.

Stansbury and Leger Fernández can explain the general scope of their offices’ work without identifying classified programs, sensitive meetings, or protected personnel information. If some details cannot appropriately be discussed, they can say so and describe the governing safeguards instead.

The other delegation members should likewise explain whether their coordination with Swalwell extended into New Mexico defense or nuclear-security matters. The public record reviewed here does not answer that question.

Election does not eliminate the security question

Members of Congress do not undergo the ordinary security-clearance process. Congressional Research Service explains that constitutional officeholders are traditionally deemed to satisfy trustworthiness requirements for eligibility. But election does not confer unlimited access: classified information remains tied to legislative responsibilities and need-to-know.

That distinction makes our question more important—not less.

What process addresses emerging security concerns involving elected officials who receive sensitive information? What happens when their circumstances change? And how do congressional offices ensure that coordination with another office does not exceed appropriate information-sharing boundaries?

Those are questions about institutional safeguards, not a demand that lawmakers disclose secrets.

Why we are asking before a breach is proven

Our concern is informed by years of experience in the nuclear enterprise. Preventive security does not begin only after someone proves that information was stolen.

Federal counterintelligence guidance identifies severe personal stress, financial distress, and other exploitable circumstances as potential indicators requiring context and professional assessment. Such circumstances are not proof of disloyalty, and personal hardship should not be treated as misconduct.

Nor does collection always involve someone knowingly handing over a document. Federal guidance describes elicitation—drawing information from an unwitting person through apparently ordinary conversation—and targeting people for their professional relationships and potential access.

Those are general threat mechanisms. They do not establish that Swalwell disclosed information or that New Mexico officials were compromised.

They explain why asking about safeguards is reasonable.

Three questions for all five members

We invite Heinrich, Luján, Stansbury, Vasquez, and Leger Fernández to answer:

1. Beyond the public bills and letters identified here, did your office coordinate with Swalwell or his staff on New Mexico military, laboratory, NNSA, or other defense-related matters? Please describe only what can appropriately be made public.

2. What safeguards governed any sharing of classified or other protected information, and has your office reviewed those procedures or sought security guidance in light of the publicly reported Fang–Swalwell counterintelligence concerns?

3. Have you sought reassurance from the appropriate security authorities about any concerns relevant to your office’s work? Without discussing an individual investigation, what can you tell constituents about how potential vulnerabilities are assessed and addressed?

These are public questions, not a document request. We seek no classified details, access rosters, personnel files, or descriptions of security vulnerabilities.

Each member may respond through an official X or Facebook account or provide a statement for publication. We will update this article with their answers and correct factual errors brought to our attention.

Public collaboration with Swalwell does not establish wrongdoing. But it should not prevent New Mexico’s delegation from explaining the scope of that collaboration and the safeguards surrounding it.